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All doctors are often required to make assessments of their
patients’ decision-making capacity (DMC). This role is
prominent in liaison psychiatry services, as psychiatrists
may be asked to provide a second opinion on DMC for other
medical specialties (e.g. regarding consent for a surgical
procedure). In the UK, psychiatric second opinion tends to
be requested following refusal of treatment by a patient,1
but also when the assessment is likely to be highly complex
or is driven by an underlying psychiatric disorder.1,2 DMC is
also routinely assessed in the UK in psychiatric patients in
emergency settings such as accident and emergency (A&E)
departments. At the time of the audit guidance by the Care
Quality Commission3 recommended that assessments
regarding DMC to consent to treatment and admission
should be made on all patients at the point of admission to a
psychiatric hospital to clarify whether it was an admission
authorised through the consent of a patient with DMC or
under the ‘best interests’ procedures in a patient who is
assenting but lacking DMC.
In England and Wales the legal criteria through which
DMC is assessed are provided by the Mental Capacity Act
2005, with further guidance in its Code of Practice.4 Under
the Act, for a person to lack DMC evidence is required that
they suffer from ‘an impairment of, or a disturbance in the
functioning of, the mind or brain’ (Section 2(1)), and that as
a consequence of this they are unable to perform at least
one of the following tasks: ‘(a) to understand the
information relevant to the decision, (b) to retain that
information, (c) to use or weigh that information as part of
the process of making the decision, or (d) to communicate
[their] decision’ (Section 3(1)). DMC is ‘decision speciﬁc’
rather than a ‘blanket’ or global ability: it is tailored to the
speciﬁc decision at hand and recognises that different
factors may inﬂuence different decisions.
There are additional considerations during the assess-
ment of DMC, in that the assessor must also take heed of
the principles of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 which
include that ‘A person must be assumed to have capacity
unless it is established that he lacks capacity’ and ‘A person
is not to be treated as unable to make a decision unless all
practicable steps to help him to do so have been taken
without success’ (Section 1). Recently the House of Lords
Select Committee on the Mental Capacity Act 2005 heavily
criticised the implementation of the Act: ‘Our evidence
suggests that capacity is not always assumed when it should
be. Capacity assessments are not often carried out; when
they are, the quality is often poor. [ . . . ] The presumption of
capacity, in particular, is widely misunderstood by those
involved in care’.5
We know that patients lacking DMC to consent to
treatment are common in both general medical in-patient
(around 40%)6 and psychiatric in-patient settings (around
60%).7 An assessment and decision regarding DMC has
signiﬁcant repercussions for the patient, either respecting
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Aims and methodWe aimed to audit the documentation of decision-making capacity
(DMC) assessments by our liaison psychiatry service against the legal criteria set out
in the Mental Capacity Act 2005. We audited 3 months split over a 2-year period
occurring before, during and after an educational intervention to staff.
Results There were 21 assessments of DMC in month 1 (6.9% of all referrals), 27
(9.7%) in month 16, and 24 (6.6%) in month 21. Only during the intervention (month
16) did any meet our gold-standard (n=2). Severity of consequences of the decision
(odds ratio (OR) 24.4) and not agreeing to the intervention (OR= 21.8) were highly
likely to result in lacking DMC.
Clinical implications Our audit demonstrated that DMC assessments were
infrequent and poorly documented, with no effect of our legally focused educational
intervention demonstrated. Our ﬁndings of factors associated with the outcome of the
assessment of DMC conﬁrm the anecdotal beliefs in this area. Clinicians and service
leads need to carefully consider how to make the legal model of DMC more
meaningful to clinicians when striving to improve documentation of DMC assessments.
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autonomy or paving the way to surrogate decision-making
under ‘best interests’. It is therefore important to document
clear justiﬁcation for a decision reached, under the
statutory criteria of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Previous
work in the USA has shown poor documentation of DMC in
a retrospective study of in-patient lumbar punctures
authorised by a surrogate decision-maker (3 patients
had DMC documented out of 25 procedures authorised by
a surrogate, although in 21 cases there was enough
information to ‘infer’ lack of DMC).8
Our aim was to audit the documentation of DMC
assessments provided by our liaison psychiatry service
against the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and its Code of
Practice, and the guidance issued by contemporary
literature.9 Subsequently, we employed an educational
intervention in our service to see whether this improved
documentation of the assessments. We collected detailed
information on the factors inﬂuencing the assessment of
DMC to see whether this had an impact on the quality of
DMC assessment or of the intervention.
Method
All new referrals received by the King’s College Hospital
Liaison Psychiatry Team, South London and Maudsley NHS
Foundation Trust (SLaM), during the month of November
2011 were collated. The team is split into the accident and
emergency team and the general in-patient team covering
all referrals. In working hours there are also specialist child
and adolescent mental health services (CAMHS), older
adults, neuropsychiatry and perinatal psychiatry teams. All
referrals outside of working hours are taken on by the
general service. CAMHS referrals were excluded from this
audit.
Assessments of DMC performed by members of the
team are completed without a formal template or form and
were documented in the SLaM electronic medical record
(EMR) as free text. All patient contacts by the team need to
be recorded in the SLaM EMR.
The EMR was searched for documentation of
assessments of DMC by searching for the word ‘capacity’
and any statement declaring that the patient had or lacked
DMC was taken to be an assessment of DMC. The entire
duration of the patient episode related to that referral was
audited. Statements that suggested the patient may or may
not have DMC but that did not make formal declaration
were taken by this audit to be an assessment of DMC. The
exception to this were statements that suggested the person
may lack DMC, but that formal assessment could be
delayed.
We set our gold-standard to require documentation of:
(1) justiﬁcation of the timing of the assessment/attempts to
maximise DMC in accordance with the principles of the
Mental Capacity Act 2005 and; (2) the full statutory criteria
of DMC (presence or absence of a disorder of ‘mind or
brain’, and performance on the four key abilities). We
excluded the need for an explicit statement linking
psychopathological features of the disorder of ‘mind or
brain’ to any deﬁcit found in the four key abilities given that
some patients were found to not have a disorder of ‘mind or
brain’.
Further information was gathered, including: basic
demographic information, whether the assessment took
place in or out of hours, the decision for which DMC is
being assessed, the professional background of the assessor,
and whether the person agreed or objected to the
intervention/option proposed. The severity of potential
consequences to the patient regarding refusal of the
intervention for which DMC was assessed was also
quantiﬁed, and classed as mild, medium and severe risk of
adverse outcome (by a psychiatrist with experience of DMC
assessments and patient management in this clinical
environment). An example of a severe risk is a refusal of
admission into a psychiatric hospital by a patient with ﬂorid
psychosis or refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment; an
example of mild risk is a refusal to contact relatives for
information-sharing regarding the patient’s clinical episode.
Following the audit in November 2011 (month 1), we
analysed the initial results. Given that none had met our
gold-standard (see below), we designed an educational
intervention to improve clinicians’ understanding of the
legal framework of the assessment of DMC and how to
document this appropriately. The intervention took place
during the week psychiatrists in training (senior house
ofﬁcers (SHOs)) change jobs (February 2013, month 16), and
continued for the following 4 weeks. It involved the lead
auditor (B.S.) meeting with the medical (SHO) and nursing
(psychiatric liaison nurses (PLNs)) members of the liaison
team and explaining the gold-standard of DMC document-
ation; presenting this to the on-call SHOs during their
induction as they may cover the team out of hours; and
emailing the SHO cohort and the senior doctors on call
(specialist registrars (SpRs)) on a weekly basis with the
guidance. Posters with the guidance were put up in the
departmental ofﬁces seen by the PLNs and SHOs.
The 4-week period in February 2013 (month 16) during
which the intervention was applied was audited, along with
the month of July 2013 (month 21), using the methods
described above. This audit was reviewed and approved by
the trust Psychological Medicine Audit Committee in
January 2012.
Results
In month 1, there were 21 (6.9%) assessments of DMC for
306 referrals, in month 16 there were 27 (9.7%) assessments
for 278 referrals, and in month 21 there were 24 (6.6%)
assessments for 365 referrals (Table 1). Overall, DMC was
assessed in 72 (7.6%) out of a total of 949 referrals.
None met the gold-standard in months 1 or 21,
however, 2 (7.4%) did during the intervention in month 16
(Table 1) and both of these assessments were performed by
the SHOs who had received the educational intervention.
Results were similar when using our lower standard of
documentation of the full statutory criteria: n = 2 (9.5%) in
month 1, n = 6 (22.2%) in month 16 and n = 2 (8.3%) in
month 21. The majority of those failing this standard missed
out several elements; only 3 (4.2%) assessments missed
reaching the standard through missing only one of the four
key abilities, whereas 38 (52.8%) assessments documented
none of the four key abilities. We therefore cannot conclude
the educational intervention had any impact at all.
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Where recorded, we looked at how frequently the key
abilities to be tested were lacking in people who lacked
DMC. Lacking the ability to ‘use or weigh’ information was
most common (n = 19, 73.1% where recorded), followed by
‘understanding’ (n = 10, 43.5% where recorded), ‘retaining’
(n = 8, 57.1% where recorded) and ‘communication’ (n = 4,
33.3% where recorded).
The majority of assessments of DMC were performed
by doctors (n = 51 (70.8%) v. n = 21 (29.2%) assessments
performed by the PLNs). Of the PLNs’ assessments only 3
(14.3%) patients were found to lack DMC, whereas of the
doctors’ assessments 33 (64.7%) patients lacked DMC
(Table 2). PLN assessment was signiﬁcantly more likely to
result in a positive DMC than a doctor assessment
(OR= 11.0, 95% CI 2.9 to 42.5). The doctors met the gold-
standard (n = 2, 4%) and full statutory criteria (n = 9, 18%)
more often than the PLNs (n = 0 and n = 1, 5% respectively).
We separated the types of decisions to be made by the
patient into those that involved ‘psychiatric admission or
treatment’ and ‘medical admission or treatment’. For the
purposes of the audit, decisions to start a new admission in
hospital or discharge oneself from a current admission were
seen as interchangeable. Medical and psychiatric decisions
were not mutually exclusive and a proportion of patients
were assessed for both. There were assessments of DMC
that did not focus on these decisions, but they were a
minority and focused on decisions not normally tested in
this setting, such as DMC to make a decision around
ongoing homelessness (n = 1) and ongoing abusive relation-
ship/domestic abuse (n = 2). These non-treatment-focused
assessments of DMC all occurred as part of the psychiatric
assessment by a PLN or doctor rather than following a
request for second opinion from the medical teams.
We found that the proportion of assessments of DMC
for medical admission or treatment formed the majority of
assessment at the start of the audit month 1 (n = 17, 81%),
but this reduced over the course of the audit in month 16
(n = 12, 44%) and month 21 (n = 8, 33%; Pearson’s w2 = 9.91,
P =0.007) (Table 3). Conversely, assessments for psychiatric
admission or treatment were the minority at the start of the
audit (n = 5, 24%) and increased in month 16 (n = 13, 48%)
ORIGINAL PAPERS
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Table 1 Frequency of DMC assessments, demographics, and number meeting audit standards by montha
Month 1 Month 16 Month 21 Total sample
Total referrals, n 306 278 365 949
DMC assessments, n (%) 21 (6.9) 27 (9.7) 24 (6.6) 72 (7.6)
Age, years: mean (s.d.) 45.2 (14.8) 39.3(15.4) 45.6 (15.0) 43.1 (15.2)
Female, n (%) 12 (57.1) 14 (51.9) 14 (58.3) 40 (55.6)
Patients found to have DMC, n (%) 6 (28.6) 16 (59.3) 14 (58.3) 36 (50)
Assessments documenting the statutory criteria, n (%) 2 (9.5) 6 (22.2) 2 (8.3) 10 (13.9)
Assessments meeting the audit gold-standard, n (%) 0 2 (7.4) 0 2 (2.8)
a. Some patients had more than one DMC assessment. There were no signiﬁcant differences between months.
Table 2 Outcome of DMC assessment based on assessing clinician
DMC present
No Yes Total
Assessing clinician, n (%)
PLN
Doctor
3 (14)
33 (65)
18 (86)
18 (35)
21 (29)
51 (71)
Total, n 36 36 72
DMC, decision-making capacity; PLN, psychiatric liaison nurse.
Table 3 Decisions for which DMC was assessed and numbers agreeing with the intervention by month
Month 1 Month 16 Month 21
Total sample
n= 72
Decisions to be made, n (%)
Medical admission or treatment
Psychiatric admission or treatment
17 (81)a
5 (24)
12 (44)a
13 (48)
8 (33)a
13 (54)
37 (51)
31 (43)
Agreement status, n (%)
Agreeing
Not agreeing
(or unable to express a choice/not documented)
5 (24)
16 (76)
15 (56)
12 (44)
12 (50)
12 (50)
32 (44)
40 (56)
DMC, decision-making capacity.
a. Pearson’s w2 = 9.91, P=0.007.
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and month 21 (n = 13, 54%), although the differences were
not statistically signiﬁcant.
We separated the choices of people who were having
their DMC assessed into agreeing with the intervention
proposed by the assessor/medical team and objecting/
unable to express a choice/unknown. Fewer people were
assessed who agreed with the intervention in month 1 (n = 5,
24%), but in months 16 and 21 they made up half of those
assessed (Table 3). Agreement with the intervention was
strongly associated with a ﬁnding of DMC: 26 (81%) of those
agreeing with the intervention were found to have DMC,
compared with only 10 (25%) of those who did not agree
(either objecting or otherwise) (Table 4). This was highly
statistically signiﬁcant (Pearson’s w2 = 22.50, P50.001).
Most assessments made by the PLNs were done in patients
agreeing to the intervention (n = 15, 71%), contrary to doctor
assessments (n = 17, 33%).
A logistic regression was performed to ascertain the
effects of the assessor (PLN or doctor), agreement with the
intervention and consequences of the decision. Initial
models also included decision to be made and underlying
mental disorder, however, these were removed from the
ﬁnal model as they had no effect.
The ﬁnal regression model was statistically signiﬁcant
(Pearson’s w2 = 45.81, P50.001). The model explained 64.7%
of the variance (Nagelkerke R2) and correctly classiﬁed
81.2% of the outcome of the assessments of DMC.
Factors associated with the ﬁnding of lack of DMC
were: more severe consequences of the decision (OR= 24.4,
95% CI 3.47 to 171.8), not agreeing with the intervention
(OR=21.8, 95% CI 4.0 to 118.8), and assessment by doctor
rather than PLN (OR= 14.9, 95% CI 2.1 to 104.5).
Discussion
We have shown evidence that documentation of 72 DMC
assessments in 3 sampling months in a liaison setting was
poor, with only 2 assessments reaching our gold-standard.
The impact of a legal education intervention was very
limited and was not sustained beyond the month in which it
was applied.
There are several possible reasons as to why the
proportion of assessments meeting our gold-standard was
so low, even after the educational intervention. Clearly, a
lack of documentation of all components of the assessment
of DMC does not necessarily equate to these components
not having been considered by the clinician assessing DMC.
However, there is limited documentary justiﬁcation of the
nature of the clinical assessment and the legal model of
DMC. Perhaps elements of the education intervention itself
(design, style, length etc.) may not have been an effective
means of conveying the information, although our audit was
not designed to evaluate this. The explicit reference to the
principles of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 in our gold-
standard might have set the standard too high, but even our
more lenient ‘full statutory criteria standard’ was only
achieved in 13.9% of assessments during the course of the
audit.
Where lies the difﬁculty in translation of the legal
model to clinical assessments? In situations where evidence
is presented to the Court of Protection (the civil court in
England and Wales with the jurisdiction for cases in which
an individual lacks DMC), the Court requires completion of
prescribed forms that demand a level of evidence similar to
our gold-standard. In a busy clinical environment it is easy
to see how documentation of the presence or absence of
DMC could be considered to be sufﬁcient by clinicians. A
process that might slow the system down (or be perceived as
such) can be expected to be powerfully resisted.
It is interesting that the assessments of DMC by PLNs
result more often in the patient being concluded to have
decision-making capacity. This ﬁnding needs to be
approached with caution given that DMC assessments
were triggered by several different reasons in our audit,
including either: (1) a second opinion assessment of DMC,
usually in the context of a patient refusing treatment, in
which the assessment would be performed by a doctor; or
(2) an assessment of DMC in the context of admission to
psychiatric hospital performed by any clinician.
As doctors performed all second opinions of DMC
assessment, usually in the context of a patient refusing
treatment, and they assess all patients who will need
compulsory admission to hospital, there is a referral bias.
The majority of DMC assessments performed by the PLNs
were in the context of a patient agreeing with the suggested
intervention, and hence were used to support the clinical
assessment. If there is no dispute around the intervention
offered, then DMC assessment has little consequence and it
is easier to presume DMC.
The strong association between lack of DMC, high
severity of outcome, refusal and lack of assent is striking. To
our knowledge this is the ﬁrst piece of work that has clearly
demonstrated this association in real clinical practice. It
would seem to suggest that clinicians when assessing DMC
in practice use an outcome test of DMC rather than the
functional test the law requires. Kim et al10 have shown that
assessments of DMC by clinicians using video simulations of
ORIGINAL PAPERS
Spencer et al Decision-making capacity assessments
Table 4 Outcome of DMC assessment based on agreement with the proposed interventiona
DMC present
No Yes Total
Agreement status, n (%)
Agreeing
Not-agreeing (or unable to express a choice/not documented)
6 (19)
30 (75)
26 (81)
10 (25)
32 (44)
40 (56)
Total, n 36 36 72
DMC, decision-making capacity.
a. Pearson’s w2 = 22.50, P50.001.
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consent discussions around involvement in research are risk
sensitive. This echoes early work on conceptualising DMC
as necessarily risk sensitive.2 Owen et al11 reported an
association between treatment refusal and DMC assessed
using the MacArthur Competency Assessment Tool for
Treatment. Although the association is striking, we consider
it to be largely expected, given the selection bias that
assessments of DMC performed as a second opinion by our
service are normally prompted by treatment refusal in the
context of a possible mental disorder, when refusal is likely
to result in signiﬁcant harm to the patient. It is reassuring
that there are a proportion of assessments where people are
found to have DMC despite the refusal and high severity of
consequences, and we submit that this is evidence of careful
clinical consideration of each case on its own merits.
Our audit has shown that there are limitations in the
recording of assessments of DMC, and that uptake of an
educational intervention was limited. We consider that this
is likely due to the perceived disconnect between the legal
assessment and clinical assessment. We would recommend
that the next step in the audit cycle should include an
educational intervention on the assessment of DMC with a
formal evaluation, with exploration and focus on clinical
factors and their relationship to legal criteria in order to be
more acceptable for clinicians.
In conclusion, we have found evidence for the
anecdotal belief on the impact of severity of consequences
and agreement status of the patient on the outcome on their
assessment of DMC. Reassuringly, these factors were not
totally deterministic of the outcome but they do suggest
that, in practice, the functional test of DMC is yet to fully
bed down.
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